This article studies dynamics in a model where agents forecast a one dimensional state variable via ordinary least squares regressions on the lagged values of the state variable. We study the stability properties of alternative transformations of the state variable that the agent can endogenously set forth. We study the consequences on the economy's stability of the typical transformations that an econometrician would attempt, such as di¤erencing, detrending, or taking instantaneous concave transformations, such as logarithms. Surprisingly, for the considered class of economies, we found that these transformations are destabilizing, whereas alternative transformations, which an econometrician would never consider, such as convex transformations, are stabilizing. Therefore, we ironically …nd that in our set-up, an active agent, who is concerned about learning the economy's dynamics and, in an attempt to improve forecasting, transforms the state variable using the standard transformations, is more likely to deviate from the steady state than a passive agent.
Introduction
A long held view about the axiom of perfect foresight is that while it is an important conceptual tool for understanding those aspects of the formal content of economic models that do not rely on agents making forecasting errors, it is an exceedingly strong assumption 2 that can at best be justi…ed in a stationary environment. Whether an economy ends up in a stationary environment in turn depends on how agents forecast and learn about the dynamics. One way of modelling this adjustment process is via "bounded rationality", 3 as exempli…ed by the temporary equilibrium approach, where forecasts are allowed to be based on a given statistical procedure, with agents estimating some structural parameters from past data.
The simplest stationary environment is a deterministic steady state. Recent studies, such as Grandmont (1998) , have shown that a steady state is locally unstable under learning dynamics whenever an agent's forecasting rule extrapolates a large enough set of trends in deviations from the steady state. For example, the learning dynamics generated by ordinary least squares (OLS, henceforth) learning, where agents forecast the endogenous state variable via regressions on its lagged values, extrapolates all trends in past data and consequently produces local instability. In the face of such instability, it is sensible to consider that a Walrasian agent would modify the state variable to improve the forecasting capability of her model. This practice is habitual in applied econometrics with time-series data, where series are routinely di¤erenced, detrended or subjected to instantaneous transformations, such as logarithms. These transformations are carried out with the goal of achieving homogenous time series data that are easier to model. This article asks whether such modi…cations might make the learning dynamics more stable and lead to improved forecasts in the long run.
The formal model is one with a unique deterministic steady state which is unstable under the perfect foresight dynamics. Agents will be assumed to generate a point forecast of the future value of the state variable via OLS on its lagged values. 4 With OLS on endogenous 2 Radner (1982) writes "Although it is capable of describing a richer set of institutions and behaviour than is the Arrow-Debreu model, the perfect foresight approach is contrary to the spirit of much of competitive market theory" and goes on to state that "this approach seems to require of the traders a capacity for imagination and computation far beyond what is realistic". 3 In support of the bounded rationality approach, Radner (1982) writes "In a theory of adjustment towards rational expectations equilibrium, what are the appropriate assumptions about the agents'rationality during the "learning process"? As agents revise their market models, the true market model changes in a way that, in principle, depends on the revision rules of all agents. Thus, a theory of thorough -going rationality would seem to point to a treatment of the learning and adjustment process as a sequential game with incomplete and imperfect information. In my opinion, such an approach would be unrealistic and contrary to the spirit of a process of adjustment and learning. A more realistic alternative would envisage some form of "bounded rationality" during the adjustment process, which if stable would converge to a fully rational equilibrium". 4 We will focus on the dynamics in a deterministic setting. The results are robust to small independent variables, the asymptotic shape of the underlying equilibrium map of the economy (which summarizes the dependence of the current value of the state variable on its forecasted value) determines what rates of growth the learning dynamics can sustain in the long run and drives the stability of the learning dynamics. For instance, a linear equilibrium map is known to generate instability for initial parameter estimates that are large enough. We de…ne an Unstable Formulation (UF, henceforth) as one which essentially works like a linear equilibrium map asymptotically and hence leads to divergent paths whenever the initial parameter estimate is large enough. We also consider a bound on the asymptotic growth rate of the equilibrium map that is shown to preclude the divergence to in…nity of the state variable and the parameter estimates. An equilibrium map with this property is said to induce a Globally Stable Formulation (GSF, henceforth) of the learning dynamics. 5 The article recognizes that, in a framework where an agent modi…es certain structural features of her linear regression model in the face of instability, whether or not a GSF is induced is an endogenous aspect of the learning dynamics, and examines the implications of this endogeneity.
We examine the case where the agents reformulate their linear regression model on an instantaneous transformation of the state variable forecasted initially, and …nd, counter intuitively, that the standard transformations used in time series analysis to stabilize the data, namely concave transformations, tend to have a destabilizing e¤ect on the learning dynamics. In contrast, su¢ ciently convex transformations, that appear to exaggerate the divergent trends in the data, are shown to have a stabilizing e¤ect, in that they may induce a GSF when the dynamics in the original variable are unstable. We also examine the case where an agent starting with a linear regression model, reformulates the model on the …rst di¤erences of the (logged) state variable or on the detrended state variable. In both cases, we show that neither di¤erencing nor detrending are stability-enhancing.
In modelling learning in a decentralized Walrasian setting where agents are truly uncertain about the dynamics of the system, a natural requirement to impose on the learning scheme is that agents are willing to interact with market data and extrapolate a wide set of trends, in particular, divergent trends from the steady state. Earlier studies (Chatterji (1995) , Grandmont (1998) ) have pointed out that a greater willingness to learn in the above sense, somewhat paradoxically, makes it less likely that agents will end up in the steady state. This instability principle is a local phenomenon. While there exist formulations where the and identically distributed shocks in the market clearing process. Throughout we restrict agents to point forecasts. The issues examined here continue to be relevant, but are more complicated when expectations are stochastic. 5 The notion of stability is a weak one. It merely ensures that the state variable does not diverge to in…nity. Under an additional contracting condition on the equilibrium map, this notion of stability leads to global convergence to the steady state.
learning dynamics may remain bounded or even globally convergent to the steady state in the long run (in spite of the local instability; see 2.1.3 below), there are arbitrarily long periods where the dynamics appear to be divergent. Our results imply, once again somewhat paradoxically, that these stable con…gurations require that agents have to systematically ignore the fact that their model appears to be an inadequate model for the (arbitrarily long) "unstable"phase of the learning process where the dynamics appear to be exploding, and desist from making the natural transformations, as these may eventually destabilize the global dynamics via the e¤ect they induce on the asymptotic behaviour of the equilibrium map. As a practical conclusion, this raises doubts on the usefulness of applying the standard econometric transformations that attempt to stabilize the series before forecasting. An agent who disregards the local instabilities and stick to her initial model would end up in the perfect foresight steady state. On the other hand, an agent attempting to actively learn the true dynamics of the economy, will end up destabilizing the economy and will never arrive at a perfect foresight equilibrium.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview and establishes the basic model and concepts. Sections 3 and 4 consider the relation between stability and transformations for the cases of instantaneous transformations and dynamic transformations respectively. Section 5 concludes and o¤ers some suggestions for future research. All proofs are gathered in Section 6. An Appendix provides an extension to bounded domains.
Preliminaries
This section provides an overview of the article, speci…es the model and the two main concepts related to stability, and then establishes a preliminary result.
An Overview
2.1.1 Formulation. We analyse the dynamics generated by OLS learning in a set up where an agent at date t needs to forecast the value a state variable (assumed to be a real number) takes in the next period to determine her optimal action at that date. The forecast, in conjunction with market clearing conditions, determines the value of the state variable at date t. The dependence of the current value of the state variable, x t ; on its forecasted value x e t+1 ; is summarized by the Temporary Equilibrium Map (henceforth TEM)
We assume there is a unique steady state value which is normalized to zero, so that 0 = f (0):
The actual dynamics of the economy depend on how the forecasts x e t+1 are formed. The agent will be assumed to know the steady state value of the state variable, but not know the dynamics of the system outside the steady state. Their "view of the world" will be assumed to be summarized by a model of the form x t+1 = x t + " t+1: At date t the agent uses OLS to estimate from past deviations x t 1 ; :::; x t L and generates the point forecast x e t+1 : The actual dynamics of the economy are thus determined by the composition of the TEM with the forecasting rule emerging from OLS learning. An important feature of this formulation is that agents do not internalize the true relationship between their actions and the market clearing value of the state variable. This is a standard feature of learning behaviour in temporary equilibrium models. This reduced form approach is applicable to settings where it is appropriate to model learning by "small"and hence boundedly rational agents, and applies in particular to Walrasian environments. It has been extensively used to study learning dynamics in rational expectations models and in overlapping generations economies. We illustrate using an example of a competitive equilibrium in a standard overlapping generations model.
Example 1 (to be continued) (Fuchs (1979) ). Consider a overlapping generations economy in which one consumption good is available each period, there is a …xed stock of money M , and one agent is born every period and lives for two periods. The agent has the utility function U(c 1 ; c 2 ) = log c 1 c 2 and receives an endowment (in the consumption good) of $ 1 when young and $ 2 when old where $ 1 > $ 2 : Let p c and p m be the prices of the consumption good and money respectively. In order to decide how much to consume in the …rst period of life, a young agent has to forecast the relative price for the next period. Suppose …rst that agents forecast the nominal price level P p c =p m : Utility maximization with current nominal price given by P t and forecasted nominal price level given by P e t+1 leads to a demand for money by the young agent given by m
The money market clearing condition m d (P t ; P e t+1 ) = M yields the linear TEM
, that gives the market clearing nominal price as function of its forecasted value. There is a unique steady state P = 2M=[$ 1 $ 2 ] which supports the Golden rule consumption allocation and as P ! 1; consumption tends to autarchy. Letting x t (P t P ) and x e t+1
(P e t+1 P ) one obtains the TEM x t = f (x e t+1 ) in deviations, with zero as the …xed point as required. Suppose next that the agents forecast the relative price by forecasting the price of money Y = 1=P instead of the nominal price. Utility maximization with current price given by Y t ; forecasted money price Y e t+1 ; and money market clearing yields
The steady state Y = 1=P supports the Golden rule consumption allocation, and as Y ! 0; consumption tends to autarchy: Here too one expresses the TEM in deviations y (Y Y ) as y t = g(y e t+1 ) with 0 = g(0):N 2.1.2 The analysis. The state variable x can alternatively be represented, via a change of variable, as y; where y = h(x) is a homeomorphism satisfying h(0) = 0. For instance, in the economy in Example 1, a young agent is required to forecast the return on money carried over to the second period of the agent's life, and can do so either by forecasting the nominal price level, or the price of money (equivalently the real balance), or indeed any transformation of these, like the natural logarithm of the nominal price. When agents forecast the representation y of the state variable, the TEM becomes y t = g(y e t+1 ) where h(f (h 1 (y e t+1 ))) g(y e t+1 ): Though in general the shapes of f and g may di¤er, if agents have perfect foresight, it does not matter which variable the agents forecast. Indeed the (backward) perfect foresight dynamics when agents forecast x are equivalent to the perfect foresight dynamics when agents forecast y are equivalent since x t = f (x t+1 ) and y t = g(y t+1 ) are topologically conjugate (Holmgren (1996) ) and therefore generate equivalent dynamics. On the other hand, the learning dynamics generated by a …xed forecasting rule may depend on the speci…c representation of the state variable on which the forecasting rule is formulated.
The forecasting rule. The literature on learning assumes that agents forecast the future in terms of the past. Let z denote the representation of the state variable that agents forecast, and instead of the perfect foresight postulate z e t+1 z t+1 for all t, consider the case where z e t+1 is predicted on the basis of its lagged values z j ; j t 1. For sake of illustration, suppose the representative agent chooses the representation z of the state variable to forecast and uses the rule z t z t 1 : Assuming that at date t, information up to only t 1 (a standard assumption in the literature to avoid simultaneous determination of z e t+1 and z t ) is available, one obtains the " -extrapolation"forecasting rule
If agents apply this " -extrapolation" forecasting rule to the representation x of the state variable, the learning dynamics are given by the iterated map
while applying it to the representation y = h(x) yields analogously y t = g (y t 1 ) g( 2 y t 1 ): 6 When h is non linear, the dynamics of these two iterated maps in general are not equivalent, unless one imposes the restriction = 1: In this paper, will be the time dependent OLS parameter estimate which can take any real value depending on past deviations of the state variable from the steady state. If the OLS model is formulated on the representation x; the forecasting rule becomes x e t+1 = 2 t 1 x t 1 where t 1 is a convex combination of past growth rates x j =x j 1, j t 1; whereas if the OLS model is formulated on y = h(x), that is, the agent's model is y t+1 = y t + t+1 , the forecasting rule becomes y e t+1 = 2 t 1 y t 1 where t 1 is a convex combination of past growth rates h(x j )=h(x j 1 ); j t 1: The dynamics generated by OLS learning depend on the asymptotic shape of the TEM. 6 The forecasting rule on x is x e t+1 = 2 x t 1 : When agents switch to forecasting y, the forecasting rule is not h( 2 x t 1 ); but is instead y e t+1 = 2 y t 1 ; i.e. we require linear forecasting (with the same factor ) on the y variable. We therefore keep …xed the " -extrapolation" forecasting rule and apply it to di¤erent representations of the state variable. 7 Since the steady state 0 is assumed to be known to the agents, no intercept is needed in the OLS estimation.
As the …rst step in our analysis, (Section 2.3), we identify a bound on the rate of divergence of the range of a TEM that acts as a stabilizing force for the OLS dynamics. A TEM which satis…es the bound on its rate of divergence is said to induce a Globally Stable formulation (GSF). Under OLS learning, the dynamics of the state variable and the parameter estimate do not diverge in a GSF. A TEM that eventually diverges at least as fast as a linear map induces an Unstable Formulation (UF), and the learning dynamics diverge for a large set of initial conditions. We study the dependence of the OLS learning dynamics on variable y = h(x) that agents formulate their OLS model on. The analysis is driven by the observation that non linearities induced via a changes of variables causes the asymptotic properties of the TEM to depend on the representation of the state variable. As the examples below outline, the stability properties of OLS learning may be reversed if agents base their regression model on an appropriate representation y = h(x) of the state variable.
Example 2 (to be continued). Let f (x) = ax, where 0 < a < 1. It is known from earlier work that OLS learning on x leads to divergence to in…nity of the state variable whenever the initial parameter estimate is large enough. The analysis of the paper will show that if h(x) is su¢ ciently convex eventually, then the induced TEM g(y
Thus g diverges slower than f and induces a GSF. Consequently, the state variable cannot diverge to in…nity when OLS learning is formulated on y = h(x).N Example 1 (continued). The learning dynamics give qualitatively di¤erent results for this economy depending on whether the agents predict the nominal price (x e t+1 = 2 t 1 x t 1 ) or the price of money (y e t+1 = 2 t 1 y t 1 ).
8 There is a qualitative di¤erence between the two forecasting rules as P (and consequently x) go to in…nity. As x t 1 ! 1; t 1 can be arbitrarily large depending on the rate at which x t 1 diverges. On the other hand, since Y = 1=P , as P ! 1, Y ! 0; and consequently y ! Y : Since the parameter estimate t 1 is a convex combination of past ratios y t j =y t 1 j ; j 1; as y t 1 ! Y , we have t 1 ! 1 and the forecasts in the limit are y e t+1 ' y t 1 , independently of the rate at which x t 1 diverges. A consequence is that autarchy is attracting when agents forecast P , that is, for a large set of initial conditions x t ! 1; but repelling when agents forecast Y , i.e. y t 9 Y : The Appendix contains the details.N One criticism of the temporary equilibrium literature is that the instability results seem to require that agents, somewhat passively, stick to their model even forecasts do not appear to improve in the face of divergent sequences of the state variable. Here we try to model an "active" agent who, though boundedly rational, attempts to use standard techniques from time series econometrics that deal with divergent streams of data that obtain in an UF, with a view to improving the forecasting performance of her linear regression model. We …rst examine the stability implications of instantaneous transformations and …nd that the standard concave transformations, routinely applied to divergent time series data, do not improve the stability properties in general and can be destabilizing; indeed in the context of Example 2 above, starting with the TEM g, a su¢ ciently concave transformation would transform the stable con…guration that obtains with the TEM g into an UF. Similar negative results hold for cases where the data is di¤erenced or detrended. We thus …nd that, for an economy with feedback, that is, where the actual motion of the economy depends on the boundedly rational agent's beliefs about the evolution of economy, standard data transformations econometricians routinely employ to deal with nonstationarities, do not in general help the agent to learn properly the economy's dynamics.
2.1.3 Related Literature. By considering a model where agents forecasts are based on OLS learning, we follow a well established tradition. Speci…cally, this article belongs to a stream of literature which recognizes the importance of including past realizations of the endogenous variables in the data set.
9 While the issues studied in this article apply to any learning scheme that extrapolates trends that di¤er from unity from past data in deviations, it is of interest to examine in detail the case of OLS with endogenous variables (see Remark 1, Section 2.2).
The dynamics under OLS are discontinuous 10 at the steady state and are divergent for an open set of initial conditions around the steady state (Grandmont and Laroque (1991) , Grandmont (1998) ). Marcet and Sargent's (1989) seminal article was the …rst to study OLS learning on endogenous variables in a general multidimensional set up. Their analysis brought to the fore the importance of the map that transforms beliefs into the actual growth rate of the economy. They presented local stability results under stochastic dynamics with a linear equilibrium map by constraining the parameter estimates to always lie in an appro-9 See, e.g., Bray (1982) , Bray and Savin (1986), Frydman (1982) , Lucas (1986) . The papers of Marcet and Sargent (1989) , Grandmont and Laroque (1991) , Evans and Honkapohja (1998) , Grandmont (1998) , and Chatterji and Chattopadhyay (2000) are ones where regressions are performed on lagged endogenous variables. This procedure is appropriate for detecting regularities in the time series of the endogenous variable outside a steady state in deterministic models, and also in stochastic models where equilibria necessarily display "memory" (Spear 1985, Spear and Srivastava 1986) . 10 We note at the outset that in a framework where agents use di¤erentiable forecasting rules, one expects the local stability results to depend on the speci…c parameterization chosen for the forecasting rule and the variables used; this is justi…ed by the usual eigenvalue analysis with su¢ ciently rich parameterizations. An early example formalizing this idea is Saari and Williams (1986) and a more recent one is Van Zandt (2003) . The analysis of this paper cannot be framed in these terms since the dynamical system one works with is nondi¤ erentiable and precludes the usual eigenvalue analysis and necessitates a global argument (in the line of Chatterji and Chattopadhyay (2000) to understand the stability properties. The analysis of global convergence in Evans and Honkapohja (1998) Theorem 2 does not apply to our framework; their assumption D.2. rules out "feedback"in the dynamical system and in e¤ect they analyse a model where regressions are performed on an exogenous variable.
priate bounded interval (via a Projection Facility) that e¤ectively rules out the divergence subsequently uncovered by Grandmont and Laroque (1991) . Evans and Honkapohja (1998) dispensed with the Projection Facility and obtained bounds on the probabilities of local convergence of the stochastic dynamics, showing thereby that it was possible to carry out local analysis without a Projection Facility. Chatterji and Chattopadhyay (2000) studied the deterministic global dynamics without imposing bounds on the parameter estimates and showed that certain con…gurations of bounds on the range of the equilibrium map may ensure that the dynamics are globally convergent to the steady state. 11 This article studies the global dynamics without imposing bounds either on the parameter estimates, or on the domain or the range of the equilibrium map, and focusses on the divergence phenomenon. Earlier work by Bray and Savin (1986) , analysed the case where agents question the validity of their OLS learning model using the traditional Durbin-Watson serial correlation test. However, in their model OLS is performed on a well behaved exogenous stochastic process; this restricts the set of trends agents extrapolate and the instability problem examined here is consequently absent.
The Model
We consider a one step forward looking model where the state variable is a real number which can take any value in the real line. 12 The economy will be assumed to be deterministic (see Dynamic interactions in the economy are captured by the TEM g : R ! R that links the forecasted value of the state variable to the current equilibrium value of the state variable.
The map g is assumed to be well de…ned.
11 This seemingly contradictory …nding on the co-existence of local instability and global stability stems from the non di¤erentiability of the learning dynamics at the steady state. Chatterji (2002) extends the global stability …nding to the case where the economy is subjected to stochastic shocks, and provides a more detailed exposition of the stability picture sketched here. 12 We do so as we wish to study stabilizing forces inherent in economies which do not stem from bounds on the state variable. In the context of Example 1, the state variable could for instance be the natural logarithm of either the nominal price or the price of money. When agents formulate their regression model directly on a price with a non negativity restriction, the state variable has a lower bound. This case is studied in the appendix.
The reduced form formulation considered above is a standard one in studies of learning dynamics in the literature. It covers linear or non linear macroeconomic models, deterministic two period general equilibrium models with overlapping generations, among others.
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The map g is derived from the underlying economy once preferences, endowments and the market clearing condition are …xed and when agents forecast the representation y of the state variable.
We now turn to expectation formation. An agent predicts deviations y t (= Y t Y ) of the state variable from its steady state value. At date t; an agent is assumed to have a "belief" t 1 about the ratio of the deviations of the state variable across periods t 1 and t. This belief is extrapolated twice, a standard procedure 14 in the literature, to generate the point forecast y
The belief at date t, t 1 is a convex combination of all past growth rates y j+1 =y j ; j = L; :; ::; t 2 in the state variable and is given by
The forecasting rule this paper considers would, for instance, arise if agents estimate a linear model such as
where is a random noise and is the slope parameter of interest. It is assumed that agents estimate using the OLS estimator based on all past realizations of y. Since the steady state is assumed known to the agents, (4) does not contain an intercept. We work with the following recursive formulation of OLS:
with m(z) = (1 + z 2 ) 1 , and subject to the initial conditions ! 2 0 = (
13 Such a reduced form formulation has been used in Marcet and Sargent (1989) , Grandmont and Laroque (1986) , Chatterji (1995) , Grandmont (1998) . Some overlapping generations formulations where such an equilibrium map arises are Fuchs (1979) , Tillmann (1983) , Woodford (1983) , Grandmont (1985) . 14 Some instances are the papers of Marcet and Sargent (1989) , Grandmont (1998) , Chatterji and Chattopadhyay (2000) .
The OLS learning dynamics are described by the TEM (1) in conjunction with the forecasting rule (2) and the updating rules (5) and (6).
The TEM will be assumed to satisfy Assumption 1: The TEM g : R ! R has 0 as a …xed point, g(0 ) = 0 ; and satis…es the global Lipschitz condition 0 b jg(y)j=jyj a for all y and some …xed a; b.
Remark 1. This formulation of the learning dynamics is of particular interest since it justi…es the forecasting procedure employed by agents on the basis of a standard econometric procedure, while capturing nicely an important feature of learning in decentralized or Walrasian set ups, whereby agents being genuinely uncertain of the dynamics of the economy, extract all linear trends from past data and extrapolate them into the future.
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Remark 2. The analysis of the article can be extended to a stochastic version of the model that speci…es at each date t, an independent identically distributed random term t , also a real number, drawn from the interval [ ; ]: The TEM then becomes g(y e t+1 ; t ) with E (g(0 ; )) = 0: 
Globally Stable Formulations and Learning Dynamics
There have been quite a few studies of the OLS learning dynamics in the recent literature on learning. These studies show that the OLS learning dynamics with a linear TEM are divergent whenever the initial parameter estimate 0 is large enough.
17 It is also known that if there are appropriate bounds on the range of the TEM, then all trajectories eventually converge to the steady state. We examine here the possibility of obtaining stability without imposing bounds.
We review …rst the mechanics of divergence with a linear TEM given by y t = ay e t+1 ; a > 0.
15 Grandmont (1998) provides a more detailed discussion of the scope of this formulation and emphasizes that in any learning story with a competitive sector, where agents are "small" and cannot coordinate (by hypothesis) to stabilize the economy, it is appropriate for agents to extrapolate all trends from past data. In an alternative approach to learning in these models, namely the "rational learning" approach (Blume and Easley (1984) , Bray and Kreps (1987) ), agents e¤ectively know the correct model. 16 An extension to stochastic economies is provided in an earlier version, Chatterji and Lobato (2009) . 17 A linear TEM can arise directly from a linear rational expectations model or can be viewed as a local linearization around the steady state of a non linear TEM arising from a general equilibrium model. In this latter case, the divergence alluded to refers to the local divergence of the learning dynamics from the steady state. This analysis implies that the OLS learning dynamics are, in particular, always locally divergent from the golden rule steady state in the overlapping generations model studied in Example 1. Indeed arbitrarily small perturbations of past prices from the golden rule price may lead to divergent dynamics since the initial parameter estimate may still be arbitrarily large depending on the ratios of the deviations of past prices from the golden rule. This instability holds for all speci…cations of preferences and endowments and is independent of which representation of the relative price the agents forecast.
When agents estimate a growth rate t 1 and extrapolate that into the future to generate a forecast t 1 ; exceeds t 1 : By an induction argument, the estimates form an increasing sequence while y t diverges. Thus with a linear TEM, the economy can sustain arbitrarily high rates of growth in that high initial parameter estimates induce an even higher actual growth rate for the economy and lead to divergence of the state variable. A similar conclusion holds for any TEM that asymptotically behaves like a linear one.
We study TEMs that do not have bounds on the range and our …rst result shows that if the TEM does not diverge too fast, then the learning dynamics cannot sustain arbitrarily high rates of growth. A bound on the rate of divergence of the TEM is speci…ed in De…nition 1 below and a TEM that evokes it is said to induce a Globally Stable Formulation (henceforth, GSF ) of the learning dynamics. For a given function f (y), the condition f (y) = O( p y); will mean that there exist constants M > 0 and N > 0, arbitrarily large but …xed, such that jyj M ) jf (y)j N p y:
By contrast, an Unstable Formulation (henceforth, UF ) occurs whenever the TEM grows at least at a linear rate eventually.
De…nition 2: A TEM g is said to induce an Unstable Formulation of the learning dynamics if there exist constants k > 0 and S > 0 such that either the condition jg(y)j > ky for y > S; or jg(y)j > ky for y < S; or both hold.
In a GSF, one gets for large jyj and j j an inequality of the form j g( 2 y) y j < j j which indicates that the actual growth induced by the belief is smaller than in modulus. This is shown to disallow the learning dynamics to sustain arbitrarily high rates of growth in the long run. In an UF, however, the inequality goes the other way (as shown earlier in the case of the linear TEM) and the conclusion is the opposite. The Proposition below summarizes the dynamic implications of the two de…nitions and the subsequent analysis focusses on how these contrasting formulations may arise.
Proposition 1. Let the TEM g satisfy assumption 1. (i) If g induces an UF of the learning dynamics, there exist n and y n , such that j t j forms an increasing sequence for t n; and jy n j ! 1: (ii) If g induces a GSF on the learning dynamics, then jy n j 9 1; j n j 9 1; i.e., for every trajectory of the learning dynamics, there exists a positive and …nite constant Q such that j n j < Q and jy n j < Q in…nitely often.
A TEM that induces a GSF has the property that under the OLS learning dynamics, the state variable and the parameter estimates cannot diverge to in…nity. 18 Having noted this stabilizing e¤ect of a GSF, in the remainder of the paper we investigate the dependence of a GSF on the representation of the state variable that agents formulate their forecasting model on.
Representations and Globally Stable Formulations
We have seen that the asymptotic shape of the TEM is critical in deciding the long run stability properties of the economy under OLS learning. The shape of the TEM is in turn dictated by the primitives of the economy (preferences, endowments, market clearing conditions etc.) and also by the representation of the state variable. In this section we …x the primitives of the economy and focus on the dependence of the asymptotic shape of the TEM on the speci…c representation of the state variable the agents formulate their forecasting model on. In particular, in sections 3.1 and 3.2 we identify classes of representations of the state variable that may transform an UF into a GSF and vice versa.
A criticism of the boundedly rational approach towards learning is that in situations where the learning dynamics do not converge to self ful…lling expectations, agents, somewhat passively, stick to their model even though forecasts do not appear to improve. We use our framework to attempt to address this criticism by allowing the agent to use the methods in time series econometrics that deal with divergent streams of data that obtain under an UF, where such series are routinely di¤erenced, detrended or subjected to instantaneous transformations, such as logarithms. These corresponds to agents forecasting di¤ering representations of the state variable. We thus try to model an "active"agent who, though boundedly rational, attempts to use standard techniques to improve the forecasting performance of her linear regression model, and assess whether such behaviour improves the stability properties of the learning dynamics. This section considers the case of instantaneous transformations by an active agent while section 4 considers the case where an agent reformulates the model on the …rst di¤erences of the state variable or on the detrended state variable. We …nd that concave transformations, that are routinely used to stabilize divergent streams of data, may actually destabilize the economy by transforming an GSF into an UF. We use this to show in section 3.3 that an active agent may fare worse than a passive one in forecasting.
In order to motivate why an agent would transform the data to make it easier to analyze, 18 This of course does not guarantee the convergence of the state variable to the steady state; an additional contracting condition on the TEM ensures the global convergence of the OLS learning dynamics to the steady state (see Remark 3 below). in Figure 1 the US annual GDP from 1945 to 2008 is plotted along with three alternative transformations: its logarithms, its di¤erences and the combined di¤erence-logarithm transformation. These graphs suggest that an econometrician would propose to employ the combined di¤erence-logarithm transformation, since it is the only one that yields stationary data. Note that these graphs are for illustration; in our formal analysis in this section, we apply the transformations to the state variable measured in deviations.
We now turn to the formal analysis. To …x ideas, choose one representation of the state variable, x; and call it the primitive. The TEM in this representation is
It is referred to as the primitive TEM and is assumed to satisfy assumption 1. An alternate representation of the state variable arises via a change of variable and is given by y = h(x) where h is a smooth, one to one change of variable satisfying h(0) = 0, so that 0 remains the steady state in the new representation as well. If the agent chooses to formulate the linear regression model on the variable y, the ensuing point forecast is given by (2) and induces the point forecast x e t+1 = h 1 (y e t+1 ); which yields x t = f (h 1 (y e t+1 )): Finally, one obtains the TEM g; which summarises the dependence of the representation y t on its forecasted value y e t+1 ; as
as is hypothesized in (1): The TEM g will henceforth be referred to as the TEM induced by the representation h: 19 We will say that h induces a GSF (UF) if the induced g induces a GSF (UF).
Notice that since h and f are not necessarily linear, the maps f and g may have di¤erent rates of growth asymptotically and may therefore di¤er in the rates of growth that they can sustain asymptotically. It is through this channel that the representation a¤ects whether or not the learning dynamics can sustain high rates of growth in the long run.
A representation h(x) will be assumed to satisfy Assumption 2: h: R ! R is a monotone, smooth change of variable that has 0 as a …xed point, h(0 ) = 0 .
This section speci…es su¢ cient conditions on h which induce an UF and a GSF respectively. In particular, an agent can move from an UF to a GSF and vice versa. As a …rst step, we observe that the two scenarios considered in this paper, respectively an UF, and a GSF, are robust, in the following sense: if one starts from either of these formulations and applies a transformation h that satis…es the Lipschitz condition outlined in assumption 3 below, one preserves the formulation in the representation g that h induces. We state the assumption below and then the robustness property which is summarized as Proposition 2.
Assumption 3: h satis…es the global Lipschitz condition 0 < c < jh(x)j=jxj < d, for all x and some …xed c; d:
19 The change of variable h may arise from a change of variable applied to the levels of the primitive state variable X. Agents …rst …x a representation Y = H(X) of the state variable on which they formulate their forecasting model and the TEM in the representation Y accordingly becomes Y t = G(Y e t+1 ) where G = H F H 1 ; which is well de…ned since H is assumed to be monotone. We assume throughout that the agents know the steady state value of the state variable. Thus, once H is …xed, agents know that the steady state of the system is Y = H(X ): It is appropriate under the hypothesis that the agents know the steady state Y = H(X ), to formulate the forecasting procedure directly on the deviation y of the state variable from the steady state. The change of variable H in absolute levels induces the change of variable h(x) in the variable x(= X X ) using the identity
We will work with representations expressed in deviations y = h(x) and with the induced TEM g(y e t+1 ):
Proposition 2. (i) Suppose that f satis…es assumption 1 and that f (x) = O( p x), so that the identity map induces a GSF, and that h satis…es assumption 2 and assumption 3. Then the induced TEM g satis…es g(y) = O( p y) and h, accordingly, induces a GSF of the learning dynamics.
(ii) Suppose that f satis…es assumption 1 and the condition of De…nition 2 so that the identity map induces an UF, and h satis…es assumption 2 and assumption 3. Then the induced TEM g satis…es the condition of De…nition 2 and; accordingly, the representation h induces an UF of the learning dynamics.
We now examine the role of eventually concave and eventually convex functions, (which violate assumption 3), in reversing the qualitative features of the learning dynamics. To understand how the eventual concavity or convexity of h translates to non linearities in the induced TEM g, it is convenient to specialize the setting to an f; which in addition to satisfying assumption 1, is eventually increasing. This ensures that any representation h satisfying assumption 2 will induce a TEM g that is eventually increasing. It will also be useful to assume that h is increasing. These assumptions allow us to work with a formula that relates the risk aversion of h with the risk aversion of the induced TEM g. Letting (y) h 1 (y); one gets g = h f : For a given increasing function r(z) that is de…ned for z > 0, let Rr(z) denote its relative risk aversion. The following formula relates the relative risk aversion of g(y) (restricting the discussion to y > 0) to the relative risk aversion of h(x) and will be useful in the sequel,
It is instructive to consider the e¤ect of the non-linearities of h on the induced TEM g when the primitive TEM f is linear. Observe therefore that if f (x) = ax, the formula (7) simpli…es to
One sees that a linear h, or indeed one with constant relative risk aversion does not cause the induced TEM g to be concave. In fact, if 0 < a < 1, the concavity of h is inversely related to the concavity of g. This also makes apparent the potential "stabilizing"e¤ect that a "very convex" h may have starting from a linear TEM f where 0 < a < 1. Indeed if the relative risk aversion of h is a su¢ ciently rapidly increasing function, one might achieve that the relative risk aversion of g is positive and large enough so as to induce a GSF. Concave transformations on the other hand, have a "destabilizing"e¤ect, that is, they can transform an f that induces a GSF (under the identity transformation) into a g that induces an UF. The following three subsections elaborate on these features.
Representations that induce Stability
In this subsection we transform, via an h, an UF into a GSF. Consider a linear primitive TEM f given by f (x) = ax where a is a positive constant. Under the additional assumption that f is a contraction, i.e. 0 < a < 1, we identify a condition on h that causes the induced TEM g to satisfy g(y) = O( p y):
Furthermore, an identical conclusion holds even if the primitive f is non linear but it is eventually a contraction, i.e. jf (x)j=jxj < a < 1 for jxj large. This follows from the next inequality, which holds, for large jyj, for any f satisfying assumption 1 and h satisfying assumption 2:
If h is a su¢ ciently convex function of jxj eventually, one gets jg(y)j to be a su¢ ciently concave function of jyj so as to satisfy the condition g(y) = O( p y) eventually and thereby induce a GSF. Noting that the Relative Risk aversion of the map g(y) = p y is 1=2; it is straightforward to verify that the condition Rg(y) 1=2 su¢ ces to establish that g(y) = O( p y): Since we are working with a linear TEM, the formula for Rg(y) is given by (8).
These observations are summarized below as a proposition without proof.
Proposition 3. Let f satisfy assumption 1 and in addition the following contracting property: jf (x)j ajxj for some 0 < a < 1 and jxj large. Let h be an increasing (respectively, decreasing) transformation, satisfying assumption 2, such that h + (x) = h 1 (x) (resp, h 1 (x)) and h (x) = h 2 ( x) (resp, h 2 ( x)) where h 1 (z) and h 2 (z) map R + to R + ; and are eventually su¢ ciently convex functions so that
[Rh j (a (y)) Rh j ( (y))] exceeds 1=2 eventually for j=1,2. Then the induced TEM g satis…es g(y) = O( p y) and h consequently induces a GSF.
The example below gives an explicitly parameterized functional form for h(x) to show that enough convexity of h leads to a GSF being induced whenever the underlying TEM f is eventually a contraction. As argued earlier, it su¢ ces to establish this for a TEM f that is linear and a contraction.
Example 2 (continued). Let f (x) = ax with 0 < a < 1. We now verify the existence of maps h that lead Rg(y) to eventually exceed 1=2: Consider the following family of increasing transformations, indexed by n, where for x 0; h + (x) = e x n 1 and h (x) = h + ( x) for x < 0: The formula for Rg(y) reduces to
Since a < 1, for n large enough, the above eventually exceeds Remark 3. In addition to inducing a GSF, the TEM g(y) obtained in Example 2 above can be shown to satisfy an additional contracting property. The contracting property in conjuction with the GSF implies that OLS formulated on y is globally stable, i.e., (y t ; t ; ! t ) ! (0; ; !) with j j 1 for all initial conditions (y 0 ; 0 ; ! 0 ): The proof of this global stability claim is a variant of the global stability analysis of Chatterji and Chattopadhyay (2000) and can be found in Chatterji and Lobato (2009) .
Representations that induce an UF
Here we provide a set of conditions on the primitive f and the representation h that ensures that the induced TEM g describes an UF of the learning dynamics. It su¢ ces to ensure that g is eventually monotone, diverges in modulus and its …rst derivative is bounded away from zero eventually. Indeed these conditions ensure that g eventually lies, for the case where the derivative is bounded away from zero by a positive number, above a line y; > 0; for y large enough. An analogous conclusion holds if the derivative is bounded away from zero by a negative number. These are summarized in the proposition below, a formal proof of which is omitted.
Proposition 4. Assume f satis…es assumption 1 and h satis…es assumption 2. (i) Suppose that f is eventually increasing and either f (y) > 0 for y >C, or f (y) < 0 for y < C, or both, for some C> 0 . Then the induced TEM g is also increasing and satis…es either g(y) > 0 for y >C, or g(y) < C, or both. If instead, f is eventually decreasing and either f (y) < 0 for y >C, or f (y) > 0 for y < C, for some C> 0 , or both hold, then the induced TEM g is decreasing and satis…es either g(y) < 0 for y >C, or g(y) > 0 for y < C, or both.
(ii) If in addition the induced TEM g is increasing (respectively, decreasing), satis…es g(y) > 0 for y > C(resp, y < C); and if g(y)
g(y) where g0(y) > c > 0 (resp, g0(y) < c < 0) for some constant c and y large enough, then g satis…es g(y) > y (resp, y) for y large enough, for some positive constant ; and accordingly induces an UF of the learning dynamics. If g is decreasing (resp, increasing), satis…es g(y) < 0 for y > C(resp, y < C); and if g(y) g(y) where g0(y) < c < 0 (resp, g0(y) > c > 0) for some constant c and y large enough; then g satis…es g(y) < y ( y) for y large enough, for some positive constant ; and accordingly h induces an UF of the learning dynamics.
It turns out that increasing and eventually concave representations h induce an UF starting from a primitive TEM f that eventually grows at some some minimal rate, in that its graph lie above the graph of a function of the form of Kx ; > 0: The Corollary below states this possibility. Corollary 1. Let f satisfy assumption 1 and grow eventually at least as fast as f (x) = Kx ; > 0; that is f (x)
f (x) = Kx for x > M , where M and K are positive constants. Then, there exist increasing representations h satisfying assumption 2 and eventually concave, that induces an UF. Speci…cally, suppose h(x ) = ln(1 + x ) for x 0: Then, the induced TEM g satis…es g(y) g(y) ln(1 + K(e y 1) ) for y large with g0(y) > c > 0 eventually, and induces an UF of the learning dynamics.
In Figure 4 we have plotted the transformation ln(1 + x ); and in Figure 5 we have plotted the initial TEM with = 0:4 and K=1, and the TEM induced by the logarithmic transformation. Remark 4. The transformation h(x ) = ln(1 + x ) for x 0 has its relative risk aversion increasing and equal to 1 asymptotically. It can be veri…ed using (7) that it su¢ ces to work with an h that has constant relative risk aversion that is no less than 1. For example, if h(x) = K ln x + c; for x M > 0; K > 0, then Rh = 1 for x large and h accordingly induces an UF of the OLS dynamics. (One can verify that if Rh is of the form 1 ; 0 < < 1; as would arise for instance via h(x) = Kx ; for x M > 0; one is left with a concave g which does not ensure an UF). One could sharpen the result further by assuming that f (x) grow slower than assumed and be given, for instance, by f (x) = K ln x: One then needs to assume a greater degree of concavity of h to reach an identical conclusion. Analogous statements hold for a primitive TEM that is decreasing.
Destabilization via Concave Representations
A standard econometric practice to stabilize a time series sequence consists of applying the logarithm to the original series of the state variable. The previous result shows that in a learning model, such as the one we consider, applying this transformation does not attenuate the instability. Therefore, in the presence of instability, there is the possibility that an agent following this practice, termed an active agent, would never stabilize the system, whereas a passive agent who would not attempt any transformation would do. Figure 6 shows this case. In particular, we have plotted for an initial linear TEM f (x) = ax; a = 1=2, the estimated "beliefs" about the growth rates of the state variable for an active and a passive agent. Note that the passive agent's initial belief is 0 = 1:76; but she sticks to her model leading to a steady convergence for her beliefs. On the contrary, the active agent transforms the state variable by taking logarithms, and her initial belief 0 = 1:14 is smaller than 0 ; despite which there is an exponential increase in the active agent's beliefs which results in instability.
We emphasize the destabilizing e¤ect of concave transformations via the following corollary where we consider a TEM f (x) that ensures that the OLS learning dynamics are globally convergent; (the state variable converges to the steady state and the parameter estimates converge to a value not exceeding one in modulus). However, there exist initial conditions that lead to trajectories that appear to be divergent in the initial stages of the learning dynamics. This is attributable to the local instability that always obtains with OLS learning whenever the initial parameter estimates are large enough and stems from the discontinuity of the learning dynamics at the steady state. Given such initial conditions, the economy would appear to be on a divergent path, and an active agent (not realizing that the dynamics will eventually converge to the steady state if she sticks with her model) may be tempted to reformulate her forecasting model in terms of a concave transformation of x so as to dampen the divergence. This transforms the learning dynamics into an UF and may lead to an active agent faring worse in the long run than the passive agent, who would stick to the original regression model formulated on x. Let x t and y t refer to the parameter estimate using the initial data x j+1 =x j ; j = L; :; ::; t 1 and h(x j+1 )=h(x j ); j = L; :; ::; t 1 respectively. Corollary 2. Let f satisfy assumption 1 and the global contraction condition jf (x)j < ajxj for all x where 0 < a < 1: Assume in addition that it eventually satis…es f 1 (x) f (x) f 2 (x) for x > S > 0 where f j (x) = Kx j ; j > 0; j = 1; 2; with 0 < 1 < 2 < 1=2: Then, OLS formulated on x is globally stable, i.e., (x t ; x t ; ! t ) ! (0;
x ; !) with j x j 1 for all initial conditions (x 0 ; x 0 ; ! 0 ). There exist increasing concave transformations h(x) satisfying Assumption 2, such that OLS formulated on y = h(x) leads to an UF with y t ! 1 whenever the initial parameter estimate y 0 is large enough. In particular, one obtains instability for initial conditions that satisfy
The condition 2 < 1=2 above ensures that a GSF is induced by the TEM f . This condition along with the contracting condition that is imposed in the Corollary above, ensures that learning dynamics formulated on x are globally convergent to the steady state (see Remark 3 above). On the other hand, if agents forecast y = h(x), where h is a suitably increasing concave transformation, then Corollary 1 applies and one gets an UF with the dynamics of the state variable diverging to in…nity for large enough y 0 : In particular, the parameter estimate y 0 obtained after applying a concave transform may be less than the original parameter estimate x 0 ; but nevertheless leads to divergent dynamics. In conclusion, the agent´s e¤orts to transform the data, so as to dampen the divergent trends in the original data, may be destabilizing for the system. 
Di¤erencing and Detrending
In the previous section we have showed that the OLS learning dynamics depend crucially on alternative static (or instantaneous) transformations of the state variable the agents forecast.
In particular, we have emphasized the destabilizing e¤ect that typical concave transformations, such as taking logarithms, may have. In practice, an agent, borrowing standard techniques from time series analysis, would likely also employ dynamic transformations of the state variable in order to stabilize it. In this section we consider dynamic transformations. Whereas static transformations only employ the current value of the state variable, dynamic transformations may be more suitable for stabilizing since they use current and past values of the state variable. In practice, common transformations involve a combination of dynamic and static transformations; for instance given a divergent sequence of past prices P j; agents may formulate their regression model on the variable Y j = log(P j =P j 1 ): It is pertinent to note that an agent would continue to employ OLS as an appropriate estimation procedure in the presence of trends, as long as these trends satisfy Grenander's conditions (see Grenander and Rosenblatt, 1957) , which allow for many types of trends.
When the agent perceives that the economy is not in a stationary environment, there are two dynamic transformations (approaches) this agent may employ to attempt to achieve an stationary framework. The main di¤erence between both approaches is whether the agent believes that the state variable is growing at a constant …xed rate or the agent believes that the state variable growth rate is random. The …rst approach is called "trend-stationarity" in econometrics and it means that the agent believes that the state variable is stationary around a deterministic trend. In the simplest framework where the deterministic trend is linear, this model entails that the agent believes that the state variable has a constant growth rate, so that in order to achieve stationarity the agent should just linearly detrend the data. In case the agent believes the trend is a polynomial of higher order, stationarity is achieved by detrending the data, which requires that one substract from the data the polynomial trend estimated by least squares. The second approach is called "di¤erence-stationarity"in econometrics and it means that the agent believes that the state variable has an stochastic stationary growth rate. In this case it is said that the state variable has a unit-root. In this case in order to achieve stationarity the agent should di¤erence the (possibly logged) state variable data.
In both, trend-stationarity and di¤erence-stationarity, cases, we will see that for an economy with feedback, that is, where the actual motion of the economy depends on the agent's beliefs about the evolution of economy, neither di¤erencing nor detrending will in general help the agent to learn properly the economy's dynamics. A similar conclusion holds for the case of log di¤erencing. It appears that knowledge of the true model seems essential to avoid the risks of inappropriate detrending and di¤erencing (see for instance Chan et al. (1977) , Kang (1981, 1984) or Durlauf and Phillips (1988) ).
First, consider that the agent reformulates the forecasting model in terms of the di¤er-ences of the current value of the state variable from its lagged value. Thus, the agents model is of the form (4) with y t = x t x t 1 and forecasts and parameter estimates continue to be given by (2) and (3) respectively. In particular, we retain the assumption that at date t, information up to t 1 is available at the time of forecasting. Thus y e t+1 = 2 t 1 y t 1 and y e t = t 1 y t 1 : In order to express the underlying TEM in terms of y, we observe that the forecast y Assuming for exposition that the primitive TEM is linear and given by x t = ax e t+1 ; one obtains y t = a 2 t 1 y t 1 + R( t 1 ; y t 1 ; x t 1 ); where R( t 1 ; y t 1 ; x t 1 ) = a t 1 y t 1 + [a 1]x t 1 : As could be expected, di¤erencing leads to stability in some cases. For instance,with a linear TEM, one can have trajectories in which the beliefs converge monotonically from above to 1=a: However, di¤erencing is not in general stability enhancing. One can show that if the initial parameter estimate 0 is su¢ ciently large, one gets the inequality y t > a 2 t 1 y t 1 which is an UF and accordingly the instability problem shows up again. Thus, di¤erencing the data is not stability enhancing in a meaningful sense. The Proposition below summarizes this fact for any primitive TEM that induces an UF.
Proposition 5. Assume the primitive TEM f satis…es assumption 1 and induces an UF of the learning dynamics. Suppose now agents formulate OLS learning on …rst di¤erences y t = x t x t 1 . Assume that the initial conditions x 0 ; :::; x L are such that x 0 and x 1 satisfy j( x 0 =x 1 )j > 1 + ; where >0, and the parameter estimate 0 (given by (3) with y t = x t x t 1 ) is large enough.
20 Then, under the dynamics with OLS learning formulated on y; j t j forms a strictly increasing sequence and both jy t j and the induced jx t j sequences diverge to in…nity.
Next, consider that the agent detrends the state variable using a polynomial and formulates the forecasting model in terms of the resulting residuals. For simplicity, we assume that there is no uncertainty associated to the estimation of the parameters of the polynomial. Thus, the agents model is of the form (4) with y t = x t P n (t) where P n (t) = P n j=0 j t j , and forecasts and parameter estimates continue to be given by (2) and (3) respectively. Here too, we retain the assumption that at date t, information up to t 1 is available at the time of forecasting. The forecast y e t+1 induces the forecast x e t+1 = y e t+1 + P n (t + 1). Assume for illustration that the primitive TEM is linear and given by x t = ax e t+1 : Then,
where R n (t) = [aP n (t + 1) P n (t)]. Assume that the agent starts to detrend the data at time t 0 ; then similarly to above, there exists an initial value t 0 large enough such that the system y t = a 2 t 1 y t 1 would lead to y t growing exponentially, so that R n (t), which is just a polynomial, does not a¤ect its eventual behavior. Thus, polynomial detrending is not stability enhancing. The Proposition below summarizes this fact.
Proposition 6. Assume the primitive TEM f satis…es assumption 1 and induces an UF of the learning dynamics. Suppose at some date t 0 the representative agent decides to detrend the data and formulate OLS learning on the detrended data y t = x t P n (t). Then, if
then y t diverges exponentially to in…nity.
Note that the role of condition (10) is to assure that R n (t) < 0 for all t > t 0 . Although the previous proposition just identi…es a particular set of conditions that induce instability, instability is a general outcome. In fact, we have performed a variety of simulations for alternative initial speci…cations where the original TEM induces an UF and we have not been able to …nd a single case in which the series y t would not diverge. Note, from equation (9), that divergence either takes an exponential form, when the leading term is a In practice, a common transformation in time series for variables that satisfy a positivity condition, takes …rst di¤erences on the logarithm, in levels, of the original data. We now assume that the primitive variable satis…es a positivity constraint in levels, that is, X 0; and has a unique steady state value X : In the next two examples we examine this combined transformation for a linear TEM and for a concave TEM. The case of the linear TEM examined below in Example 3 applies directly to the economy of Example 1 when X is interpreted as the nominal price level P .
Example 3. Assume that the initial TEM when expressed in levels X eventually behaves like
where a and b are positive constants. Notice that the steady state X is no longer 0 but b=(1 a): Now assume that the agent considers the standard transformation in econometrics, where the logarithms are applied to the data in levels to obtain
In this case the unique steady state for the new Y t variable is 0: Notice that the law of motion for Y t satis…es
When X t 1 = b=(1 a); the steady state value, then
so that the steady state corresponds to Y = 0: When X t 1 is very large compared to b; the map will approximately be Y t log a + (Y 
so that
The above law of motion is akin to an UF. Indeed for Y t 1 > 0 and …xed, if t 1 is large enough, one gets the con…guration
> t 1+j > 1; for j 1 so that Y t diverges and t forms an increasing sequence.
We have noted that in the economy of Example 1, if agents formulate their regression model on the nominal price level P , the resulting TEM is linear and consequently the formulation of the learning dynamics is an UF. From the analysis of this example we …nd that reformulating the forecasting model on the variable Y t = log(P t =P t 1 ) leaves the learning dynamics in an UF. N The previous example shows that applying the most typical transformation to a time series, namely taking di¤erences in the logged data, is not in general stability enhancing. In fact, the next example conveys a stronger message: even with an initial TEM that evokes a GSF, this combined transformation leads to the possibility of divergence to in…nity of the transformed state variable.
Example 4. Consider again a state variable in levels, X 0; with a unique steady state value X : Assume that the TEM in this representation eventually is
where 0 < < 1=2.
Suppose …rst that agents formulate their forecasting model on X: Following the procedure employed in this article, we express the linear forecasting model (2) in deviations x from the known unique steady state X , x t = X t X : It follows then that the TEM, when expressed in deviations, becomes eventually
with x e t+1 > X so as to ensure that the forecast X e t+1 = x e t+1 + X is non-negative. Since we are interested in examining the possibility of X diverging to in…nity under the learning dynamics, we restrict attention to positive values of x e t+1 ; so that the lower bound on forecasts is irrelevant: Our assumption < 1=2 ensures that this TEM satis…es the requirement of a GSF. The dynamics under OLS formulated on x therefore do not allow x t to diverge to in…nity. Now suppose the agent considers the transformation (11) and the agent's beliefs are given by applying (2) to Y to obtain (12). Then, if at some point t 0 the beliefs satisfy t 0 > 1=2 + 1=2 p 1 + 4= , then Y t constitute a nonstationary process. This result is immediate by noticing that
so that Y t follows a linear second order di¤erence equation
and a su¢ cient condition for the explosiveness of this process is that
Therefore, taking di¤erences in the logged data can be destabilizing even in the con…gu-ration of Example 4. Similarly to Section 3.3, the results from the previous example can be extended to more general settings where the initial TEM is eventually bounded below and above by power functions with power coe¢ cients bounded above by 0.5, and in addition, it satis…es an appropriate contracting condition. For these general cases, learning dynamics formulated on the original variable leads to global convergence to the steady state, whereas the learning dynamics formulated after taking di¤erences in logged data leads to divergence to in…nity. The situation is equivalent to the one graphed in Figure 5 : an active agent would fare worse in terms of convergence to the steady state than a passive agent.
Concluding Remarks
In this article, we have modelled learning in a Walrasian set up in the sense that agents do not recognize the consequences of their actions on the market clearing prices or the dependence of the prices on the actions and forecasts of other agents. The only information available to the agents are past values of the only endogenous state variable, the price. Even in the simple set up examined here, this information structure is, in principle, compatible with the agents learning and converging to the steady state. 21 Agents generate a point forecast of future prices using past prices via OLS and we examine the resulting dynamics. Earlier studies have shown that there is a tendency for the resulting dynamics to be divergent. This article has attempted to introduce some sophistication in the learning process, in that, a representative agent attempts actively to improve the forecasting ability of her model by considering several transformations of the state variable within the framework of OLS learning. We …nd that for a class of economies, standard transformations used in econometrics, like di¤erencing, detrending or concave transformations like taking logarithms, are not stability enhancing. As a practical conclusion, an active agent, who employs the standard econometric transformations to induce stability, may eventually fare worse than one that passively sticks to a …xed formulation in spite of bad forecasts in the short run. More work is needed before we obtain a better understanding of what assumptions on individual behaviour may actually underlie the perfect foresight approach to dynamic economics. Our somewhat negative …ndings tend to reinforce earlier instability results and cast doubts on whether perfect foresight is at all compatible with decentralized Walrasian behaviour 22 in the learning phase of an economy.
We …nally mention some possibilities for further work. We have considered the standard econometric practice in which the agent, by inspecting the evolution of the time series of interest, decides to stabilize the data by the use of some transformation. Alternatively, an agent could base her decisions on the outcome of speci…cation tests. These tests can be carried out in a variety of forms. In this article we have considered that the agent's beliefs are based on a simple linear autoregression of order one. Using this model as the null hypothesis, there are a variety of speci…cation tests the agent could attempt. For instance, she could consider testing that the order of the autoregression is one against a higher order. Alternatively, she could question the linearity of the autoregression and employ general omnibus speci…cation tests, such as those in Lobato (2003) . Another possibility is testing whether the autoregression of order one has constant or time-varying parameters. Finally, following the spirit of this article, the agent could stick to a linear autoregression of order one with time constant parameters and test the necessity of the alternative transformations considered.
Proofs
As a …rst step, we note the fact summarized in Lemma 1. A veri…cation of this can be found in the proof of Proposition 1 of Chatterji and Chattopadhyay (2000) and is accordingly omitted. Lemma 1. Along any trajectory, the inequality
is satis…ed.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof of divergence to in…nity of the state variable under an UF is a standard replication of known arguments (Grandmont 1998) and is omitted. We prove statement (ii) of the proposition. 22 One alternative approach would be to model the learning phase as a dynamic strategic market game where agents explicitly take into account the price formation rules (as in Chatterji and Ghosal (2004) ) but are uncertain about the strategies employed by others, or more generally, model learning in accordance with the literature on learning in games (Fudenberg and Levine 1998) . A full blown strategic approach would however be subject to the Radner critique (footnote 3).
Step (i) Consider a sample path such that j 2 n y n j < L in…nitely often for some constant L > 0: By assumption 1, j 2 n y n j < L implies that jy n+1 j =jg( 2 n y n )j < y(L) and so jy n+1 j < y(L) in…nitely often, where y(L) is a positive constant. Next, by Lemma 1, j n j < 1 + , where > 0; in…nitely often. ( 
If one sets Q =maxfy(L); 1 + g; then j n j < Q and jy n j < Q in…nitely often and the proof is complete.
Step (ii): Suppose now that j 2 n y n j diverges. If jy n+1 j < y(L) in…nitely often for some positive constant y(L), then the analysis of case (i) above applies; one has therefore j n j < Q and jy n j < Q in…nitely often, so that j 2 n y n j cannot diverge. So assume jy n+1 j diverges as well. Since g(y) = O( p y); there exist constants M > 0 and N > 0, arbitrarily large but …xed, such that jyj M ) jg(y)j N p y: Since j 2 n y n j and jy n j diverge, there exists T such that j 2 T +t y T +t j > M and jy T +t j > max fM; 4N 2 g for all t 0: It follows that for all
Since t+1 is a convex combination (with positive weights) of t and g( 2 t yt) yt , one gets j T +t+1 j j T +t j for all t 0 and so j T +t j forms a decreasing sequence for t 1: This implies in particular that along any sequence, the sequence of parameter estimates j t j remains bounded by a quantity b > 0: This in turn leads to the inequality
Now consider such that 0 < < 1. For some T 0 , jy T +t j 1 2 N b = for all t 0. It follows that, for all t 0, jy T 0 +t+1 j jy T 0 +t j < and we must conclude that y t ! 0. This contradicts the hypothesis that jy n j diverges. Thus this case cannot occur and we must always have jy n+1 j < y(L) in…nitely often for some positive constant y(L) and the proof is complete.N Proof of Proposition 2. We …rst prove part (i) of the Proposition. Assume h is increasing. By hypothesis, f (x) = O( p x); which implies that for large jxj;
Since jh
; which since h is in-
Analogous arguments apply for an h that is decreasing.
We now prove part (ii) of the Proposition. Assume h is increasing. (a) Suppose jf (x)j > kx for x > S > 0. Since f is continuous, either f (x) > kx for x > S or f (x) < kx for x > S. Suppose f (x) > kx for x > S and let y > h(S). Then f (h 1 (y)) > 0: Furthermore,
One thus has
for y > h(S): Suppose next that f (x) < kx for x > S: Then f (h 1 (y)) < bh 1 (y) < 0 for all y > h(S) and one gets g(y)
> kx for x < S < 0; by an identical argument as in case (a), for y < h( S), one obtains
Thus if h is increasing, the induced TEM g satis…es the requirement of De…nition 1. Analogous arguments apply for an h that is decreasing. This completes the proof of the proposition. N Proof of Proposition 5. For simplicity, we consider the case where the primitive TEM satis…es f (x) > ax for x large with a > 0 (the other possibilities for an UF are treated analogously) and that the initial conditions x 0 ; :::; x L are such that there exists > 0 such that j(x 0 =x 1 )j > 1 + ; and the parameter estimate 0 , given by (5), is large enough so that it satis…es that 0 > + 1 implies that
We have
) + (a 1) and we have the inequality
) + (a 1) = a( 2 0 + 0 ) + (a 1); which exceeds as required when 0 satis…es the previous conditions. Therefore, under the stated condition,
x 1 x 0 > 1 + and 1 > 0 ; and, by induction, the sequence x t diverges to in…nity and t forms an increasing sequence.
Proof of Proposition 6. We consider the case where the primitive TEM satis…es f (x) > ax for x large and a > 0. The other possibilities for an UF are treated analogously. Assume without loss of generality that t 0 and y t 0 are both positive. We will show that t for t = t 0 + 1; :::; form an increasing sequence so that y t diverges exponentially to in…nity. First, note that the stated conditions guarantee that R n (t) < 0 for all t t 0 because R n (t) = P n j=0 j [a(1 + t ; which follows from the fact that y t 0 +1 > t 0 y t 0 and the condition that t 0 > jRn(t 0 +2)j jRn(t 0 +1)j : Then, recursively note that a necessary and su¢ cient condition for t+1 > t is that y t+1 > t y t and using that y t+1 > a 2 t y t + R n (t + 1), the condition y t+1 > t y t holds when t > 1 2a
: Finally, notice that the stated conditions guarantee that the sequence jR n (t + 1)j =y t forms a decreasing sequence. To see this, note that jR n (t)j =y t 1 > jR n (t + 1)j =y t is equivalent to y t =y t 1 > jR n (t + 1)j = jR n (t)j and, while y t =y t 1 is bounded below by t 1 ; the sequence jR n (t + 1)j = jR n (t)j decreases monotonically to 1 as t tends to in…nity using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality.
Example 1 (continued). As noted earlier, when agents formulate their OLS model directly on the nominal price P; the TEM is linear and denoted as x t = f (x e t+1 ): Since the price satis…es a positivity constraint, this restricts x e t+1 to the bounded interval D ( P ; 1): When the agents formulate the model on the price of money instead, the TEM is given by y t = g(y The forecasting model when formulated on the variable y = h(x); now admits the possibility that the forecast generated by equation (2) falls outside the interval ( Y ; 1); the admissible domain for the forecasts given that the agents forecast y. To prevent this one has to specify bounds on the forecasts.
Let the forecast ensuing from (2) be denoted as 
Unrestricted use of (13) leads to the possibility that forecasts lie outside the permissible interval ( Y ; 1): Therefore we truncate (13) at k t where 0 < k t < Y and y j k t for j = t 1; t 2; :; 0; ::; L, so that the lower bound k t is less than all past realizations of the state variable up to period t 1. Formally, y e t+1 =max{e y e t+1 ; k t g Furthermore, if y t k t then k t+1 =k t , while if y t < k t then k t+1 2 ( Y ; y t ) so that the lower bound for the subsequent period, k t+1 , is updated if and only if the subsequent observation y t falls below k t . So k t is a parameter at date t and depends upon information available up to date t 1. A similar procedure is adopted to ensure that the forecast x e t+1
does not fall outside D ( P ; 1) when the agents formulate the OLS model on the nominal price.
Notice that x and y are linked via the change of variable y = h(x) where h is de…ned via the identity Y = h(X X ) + Y = H(X) with Y = H(X) = 1=X. The two TEMs f (x e t+1 ) and g(y e t+1 ) are accordingly linked via the identity h(f (h 1 (y e t+1 ))) g(y e t+1 ): The crucial feature here is that as that as x ! 1; h(x) ! Y : One extends the map g to Y by continuity, wherein Y becomes a …xed point of g even though +1, is not a …xed point of f ; also g 0 ( Y ) lim y! Y g 0 (y) exists, is given by g 0 ( Y ) = $ 1 =$ 2 where by assumption $ 1 =$ 2 > 1: 23 The material presented here is based on Chatterji and Chattopadhyay (2002) . Now suppose agents generate the forecast x e t+1 via OLS on lagged values of x: Then for x t 1 > 0; one has x e t+1 = 2 t 1 x t 1 and from the TEM one gets x t = ($ 2 =$ 1 ) 2 t 1 x t 1 : We have seen that for a linear TEM, if x 0 > 0 and 2 0 and is su¢ ciently large, 2 t forms an increasing sequence while x t ! 1. Thus the formulation of the learning dynamics in this case generates trajectories where the state variable diverges to in…nity and consequently consumption goes to autarky.
When agents forecast the variable y instead via OLS; Y ; the …xed point that corresponds to autarky, turns out to be unstable under the learning dynamics, so that y t 9 Y : The formal argument to verify this is as follows. Suppose that y t ! Y : This implies that the sequence t ! 1 and the sequence y k t , we have y t > k t also. It follows that k t+1 =k t and since t converges to 1, one also hasỹ Chatterji and Chattopadhyay (2002) analyse the global OLS learning dynamics in a class of two period lived overlapping generations economies with a unique monetary steady state that is determinate under the perfect foresight dynamics. In particular, their analysis covers the case of preferences which satisfy the gross substitutes condition and those which allow income e¤ects to be stronger than in the gross substitutes case, provided they do not cause the o¤er curve to bend back too much. They show that when agents forecast the real balance in deviations from its steady state value, autarky is unstable and the learning dynamics converge to the steady state for all initial conditions, so that one has in this case global convergence to the golden rule steady state. On the other hand, the learning dynamics when agents forecast the nominal price, diverge for a large set of initial conditions and along such trajectories, consumption tends to autarchy.
Remark 6. We clarify the working of a GSF in a setting with bounds on the state variable. Unlike Section 2, where there are no bounds on the domain or the range of the TEM and where a GSF arises via non linearities that do not allow the dynamics to sustain arbitrarily high parameter estimates, in this setting with bounds, a GSF stems from the more restrictive hypothesis that regressions are performed on a bounded state variable y. So consider a TEM f : D = ( d; 1) ! R , where -1 d < 0; that is de…ned on an interval D with a lower bound and let y = h(x) be a smooth change of variable that maps 1 to a …nite (positive or negative) value v: Along any sequence where y t ! v; the sequence t 1 ; being is a convex combination of past ratios y t j =y t 1 j ; j 1; tends to 1 and the forecasts in the limit are y e t+1 ' y t 1 : Letting g = h f h 1 ; we extend the map g to v by continuity so as to obtain the limiting …xed point g(v) = v: If one assumes that the …xed point v is repelling under the map g, one obtains y t 9 v: The analysis of the dynamics when agents forecast the price of money in Example 1 is a special case of this formulation.
